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Banks' Wholesale Funding and Credit Procyclicality: Evidence from Korea 
 




Credit procyclicality has recently been the focus of considerable attention, but what fuels the often excessive 
credit growth is rarely questioned. We investigate the relationship between the composition of banks' liabilities 
and their credit procyclicality. After examining the macroeconomic context where banks rely increasingly on 
wholesale funding (WSF), we estimate the effect of WSF on the banks’ credit growth using panel data for the 
commercial banks of Korea between 2000:1 and 2011:2. We find that a higher sensitivity of banks' WSF to the 
business cycle leads to an excessive response of credit growth to the business cycle, even with a low share of 
WSF on bank liabilities. This finding suggests that the regulation of banks’ WSF mechanism may contribute to 
financial stability through a bank credit channel of monetary policy. On the other hand, we find that overseas 
WSF has a more marked effect on credit procyclicality, which may additionally exacerbate the financial fragility 
of export-led emerging economies. 
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The relationship between the credit cycle and the business cycle has often been a major concern for monetary 
authorities and economists, and it has recently received renewed attention in the wake of the global financial 
crisis. In particular, with less and weaker financial supervision, the procyclical pattern of credit growth has 
been considered a warning signal leading up to the crises. For example, Hume and sentence (2010), Borio 
and Lowe (2004), and Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) find that the credit booms have been noticeably 
accompanied by business flush times and then followed by financial crises. 
With respect to the (over-)sensitivity of credit growth to the business cycle, many posit that a failure to 
establish appropriate regulations is the main cause of this problem. The reckless liberalization and rapid 
deregulation of the financial sector allegedly resulted in imprudent lending competition and relaxed lending  
standards, typified by the sub-prime mortgage boom in the U.S. (Arestis and Karakitsos, 2009). Soaring asset 
prices have also obscured the potential drawbacks of borrowers for future credit quality and thereby 
prevented sufficient screenings of riskier borrowers (Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 
2006). As noted by Geanakoplos (2010) and Brunnermeier (2009), when financial agents aim to adjust their 
balance sheets to hit the target leverage following an asset price growth during a boom, such adjustments 
lead to a greatly amplified credit cycle while huge debts on balance sheets simultaneously accrue. Then, in 
the downturn, this leverage procyclicality abruptly becomes as a catalyst for the far-reaching financial crisis. 
These causal factors of immoderate credit booms are not negligible. 
However, considering the bank's intrinsic role in credit creation as distinct from other financial 
intermediaries, it is also important to understand what fuels the bank's often-excessive credit growth. This 
question has surprisingly been overlooked and even treated as a minor issue with regard to credit expansion. 
Reasonably, given that commercial banks can turn to non-deposit or wholesale funding (WSF) and retail 
deposits from consumers, the banks are bound to choose from one source or another as their balance sheet 
continues to grow, which calls into question the causal links between the composition of liabilities, the credit 
cycle, and the business cycle.  
Therefore, the core question of this paper is as follows: What influences will the composition of bank 
liabilities have on the bank’s excessive credit procyclicality and hence on macroeconomic vulnerability? 
Given that banks are gradually increasing their reliance on WSF and banks' operations in the WSF market 
are occurring more frequently, this question is critical to understanding the dynamics of a macroeconomy.  
On the other hand, the recent empirical confusion regarding the "bank's leverage effect" suggests another 
point to consider when investigating the effect of WSF. While investment banks' procyclical leverage 
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adjustment is revealed explicitly, as in Adrian and Shin (2010), the existing literature fails to verify leverage 
procyclicality as banks' (mostly commercial banks) general characteristic.1 Given that the bank's leverage 
adjustment is implemented mainly through WSF and that the shares of WSF in commercial banks' liabilities 
worldwide are actually not so high as to be alarming at a glance2
However, the low share of WSF as such does not guarantee bank and macroeconomic stability. In fact, 
excessive credit procyclicality has been also found later in the form of foreign currency or in banking crises in 
the emerging economies where WSF markets are not sufficiently developed. In those economies, WSF 
accounts for insignificant portion of bank liabilities and consequently banks’ leverage growth is seemingly 
mild. The often-missing link in the existing literature seems to lie with the qualitative rather than the 
quantitative features of WSF, which is in this paper, the oversensitivity of WSF to economic fluctuations. 
Therefore, recent perceptions of WSF as a potential cause of macroeconomic instability through, e.g., 
maturity mismatch due to excessive dependence on short-term instruments, are not incorrect, and the 
monetary authorities who try to regulate the banks' WSF are not worrying unduly. We present evidence by 
focusing not only on the share of WSF per se but on the 'relative' dynamics between the sensitivity of WSF 
and bank credit to the business cycle. 
, it is not surprising that the procyclical 
bank leverage growth has not been as pronounced in all economies. 
With examining the macroeconomic and historic contexts behind the banks’ increased reliance on WSF in 
terms of  the banks’ relevant strategy, we seek to answer our questions by investigating the case of banks in 
South Korea (hereafter Korea). Using the panel data for those 14 banks during the 2000:1-2011:2 period, we 
empirically trace the causal relationship between credit procyclicality and the banks' several WSF indicators. 
The sensitivitity of WSF to the business cycle will be shown to have contributed to the excessive 
responsiveness of credit growth to the business cycle, which suggests that a tendency to over-lend can exist 
even when banks have relatively low shares of WSF.  
Furthermore, given that credit growth allegedly moving in accordance with economic growth and the prices 
of credit market instruments in the WSF market are also affected by the business cycles, an investigation of 
                                           
1 Baglioni et al. (2010) depict the leverage of European commercial banks as growing in a less visible way. Dealing with 
the U.S. commercial banks and Japanese banks, the Joint FSF-CGFS Working Group (2009) also reports that 
aggregate balance sheet leverage did not increase or even fell over the preceeding period of the financial panic in 2008. 
Panetta et al. (2009) show that the leverage of banks worldwide did not display an explicitly procyclical pattern and 
that bank leverages in a few countries were broadly stable and sometimes even declined modestly during upturns in 
the economy. 
2 Demirgüç-Kunta and Huizingab (2010)'s recent investigation of an extensive sample of 1,334 banks in 101 countries 
shows that 61.3% of the sample banks have non-deposit funding shares of less than 5%, aside from an existence of the 
fat tail of distribution. 
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the causal relationship between credit procyclicality and funding sources raises serious endogeneity 
concerns and potential biases from structural breaks of periods. To address those complicated econometric 
issues, we adopt the three-stage least squares (3SLS) method and rolling panel regressions. 
For export-led emerging economies, domestic banks' WSF from overseas markets tends to be higher to meet 
the exporters' huge demand of forward foreign exchange, for example. WSF from foreign creditors may 
function as a critical channel that affects more volatile credit fluctuations through which external shocks are 
transmitted, and thereby, the domestic economy becomes more vulnerable. Herein, we examine whether this 
additional effect exists.  This topic will cast light on the issues of financial fragility in similar open emerging 
economies. By making these relationships clear, we open the debate regarding the new regulatory measures 
for bank regulation and thereby for financial stability. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In addition to a review of the relevant literature, Section 
2 discusses the macroeconomic context of the rise of WSF and its effects on the economy. Section 3 explains 
the bank panel data used in our study and provides the graphic patterns of the aggregated bank data. In 
Section 4, we present our empirical methodology and discuss the estimation results. Section 5 estimates the 




2. Wholesale Funding and Financial Fragility 
 
In this section, we present a few elements that have contributed to banks’ higher reliance on WSF and 
critically review the pros and cons of such bank liability management.  
One of the main reasons WSF increased on the bank liabilities was the low interest rate environment since 
the early 2000s. Contrary to the remarkably high interest rates in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the interest 
rates showed an overall moderate tendency during the 1990s, apart from frequent fluctuations. With a few 
financial busts worldwide in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the interest rates in many developed economies 
began to decline noticeably and were held at record lows throughout much of the first decade of the 2000s. 
Within the overall low interest rate environment, competition for deposits among banks became more 
intense, and thus, attracting deposits became more difficult.  
The declining household savings rate is another contributing factor to the decline of deposit shares in bank 
liabilities, though this trend is not so definitive as to be generalized across economies. However, in the case 
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of Korea, the household savings rate fell from over 20.0% in the 1990s to 2.8% in 2010, which is even lower 
than the 5.7% rate in the U.S. and the 6.1% average rate of the 20 OECD countries for whom data are 
available (OECD, 2011). Though Korea's total savings rate is still higher due to high corporate and 
government savings, a drop in Korea's household savings rate in the 2000s has been substantial enough to 
impose heavy burdens on traditional bank funding. 
Moreover, with the penetrations of new financial agents, such as money market mutual funds and mutual 
funds, into deposit commodity markets, banks were forced to lose their deposit market shares and decreased 
the share of core deposits in their liabilities (Erturk and Ozgur, 2009). In effect, with the introduction and 
development of new financial instruments, such as negotiable CDs, and the expansion of overnight loan 
markets where banks can acquire funds quickly, liability management through WSF has greatly increased in 
importance as a source of bank funds. To illustrate the U.S. case, negotiable CDs and bank borrowings 
accounted for 47% of bank liabilities in 2008, a dramatic increase from the 2% share in 1960. Similarly, the 
share of checkable deposits decreased from 61% in 1960 to 6% in 2008 (Mishkin, 2009). Because the 
traditional distinctions between the bank-based and market-based systems are becoming blurred, we expect 
that banks will rely more on WSF and that the market-to-market changes will affect banks to a higher degree; 
as a result, WSF would play a more pivotal role in banks’ strategies for profitability and stability.  
It is of greater significance to note that this new trend of liability management is essential for attracting funds 
in periods when profit opportunities are derived from rapid asset price fluctuations or maturity mismatches 
between assets and liabilities.  
This aspect of WSF does not always deserve criticism. A few of the studies on banking award higher marks 
to a wholesale financier than to a deposit account holder from a microeconomic perspective. Huang and 
Ratnovski(2010) suggest that the 'bright' side of WSF is that it enables banks to fully utilize investment 
opportunities regardless of the deposit supply. That is, the traditional source of deposits held in banks is 
bound to lag behind the expansion of lending during periods of rapid asset growth. Moreover, while 
wholesale financiers allow banks to adjust quickly to the changes in assets or market conditions, depositors 
are relatively insensitive to the bank's misallocations of resources and are sluggish in punishing the bank by 
withdrawing their deposits. As a result, they cannot offer banks efficient incentives or strong market 
discipline. Furthermore, considering the criticism that banks’ safety nets encourage moral hazard (e.g., 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Calomiris (1999)), WSF instruments, which are generally not 
covered by explicit deposit insurance, may be more efficient at monitoring banks and preventing them from 
taking excessive risks. Overall, following the orthodox mainstream economic doctrine that stresses the 
beneficial effects of financial market liberalization and touts the development of new financial instruments, 
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those banks with a higher share of WSF may acquire more advanced engineering techniques, such as more 
efficient options for hedging risks and diversifying portfolios for revenue, which consequently contribute to 
higher profitability, through competitive market-based liabilities management. 
However, Huang and Ratnovski(2010), whose original purpose was to microeconomically model the 'dark' 
side of bank's WSF in contrast with our political-economic and empirical approach, explain that the bank's 
reliance on WSF may compromise credit quality due to aggressive lending and lead to inefficient 
liquidations, where wholesale financiers often exit ahead of and shift significant losses onto depositors, as 
was observed in recent bank failures. Hahm, Shin and Shin (2011) also formulate a model in which a large 
stock of a bank's non-core liabilities, a concept similar to WSF in this paper except for the empirical specifics, 
erodes risk premium and heightens vulnerability to a crisis. Demirgüç-Kunta and Huizingab (2010) 
empirically demonstrate that a further increase in the non-deposit funding share at higher levels enhances 
bank fragility, as measured by its Z-score. 
Furthermore, Demirgüç-Kunta and Huizingab (2010) insist that non-deposit WSF lowers the rate of return 
on assets, while the expected beneficial effects of risk diversification are limited only to the low levels of non-
deposit funding. In actuality, the relationship between bank profitability and non-deposit funding is not 
conclusively established due to unavoidable endogeneity problems. Though this topic should be addressed 
in other papers, we can easily expect mixed results. That is, while the higher prime cost of non-deposit 
funding is surely detrimental to bank profits, this type of funding combined with non-interest income-
bearing projects, such as securitization trading, enhances bank returns during asset price booms. Which of 
the two will have a stronger effect depends on each economy's structure and the time span3, and the 
complicated endogeneity issues warn against a hasty conclusion regarding causality. However, even though 
the profit-enhancing effect of WSF is found to be robustly significant in some samples, such as U.S. banks 
during the recent pre-crisis period, we cannot deny that those high profits were built up at the expense of the 
macroeconomic stability of the banks.4
Our paper takes a critical stance toward banks' WSF and argues that WSF, as an increasing funding source of 
banks, is not always welcome in view of the financial fragility and systemic risk associated with it, apart 
from the controversial profitability effect. Above all, as banks turn to increased WSF, the integration of the 
  
                                           
3 See, e.g., Tregenna (2009) for an explanation of the effect of the U.S. banking sector concentration on high profitability 
from 1994 to 2005. 
4 To put it another way, U.S. banks' higher profits before the current crisis increased on a feeble and irregular basis within 
a 'new financial architecture,' in Jim Crotty's words. For an account of the contradictions in the development of the 
financial sector in recent years, see Crotty (2007, 2009). 
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financial system through the provision of liquidity within and among banks and other non-depository 
institutions is accelerated. This interconnectedness among financial institutions has been cautioned against in 
a vast literature because such a relationship expands the channels of contagion; that is, problems affecting 
one bank spread to other banks and sometimes across international borders, and their propagating chain 
effects are amplified to the extent that rapid deleveraging may freeze the real economy.5
In the next sections, we explore the channel through which the liability structure of banks affects their credit 
operation and how credit cycle expansions lead to macroeconomic vulnerability. However, the strict 
empirical evidence on this channel is scarce, with the exception of Damar et al. (2010) and Jeong (2009), who 
use panel data from Canadian and Korean banks, respectively. Damar et al. (2010) argue that a bank’s 
leverage becomes more procyclical during times of increased liquidity in WSF. Jeong (2009) regresses 
corporate loan growth on GDP growth and its interaction term with the WSF ratio, thereby demonstrating 
that a bank's reliance on WSF is partly responsible for the increase in the procyclicality of bank lending. Their 
findings are broadly in line with ours. However, instead of simply estimating the effect on the leverage or on 
the corporate loan growth rate, as explained in Section 1, we pay attention to the sensitivity measure of WSF 
as well. Likewise, whether bank credit growth responds excessively to the business cycle matters in this 
paper because the procyclical lending trend itself is, to a certain extent, natural in the business cycle. 
Additionally, we first identify determinants of banks’ funding structure, accounting for endogeneity biases 




3. Data and Empirical Trends 
 
3.1. Data 
For the empirical analysis, we use balance sheet data from Korean commercial banks, which is available at  
Financial Analysis Information Retrieval System, and macro variables from the Economic Statistics System, 
both of which are under the supervision of the Bank of Korea. The data covers the period from the 1st 
quarter of 2000 to the 2nd quarter of 2011, for a total of 46 quarters. 
The panel selection criteria we adopted, that is, which bank should or should not be included in the sample, 
                                           
5 'Interbank contagion' literature suggests that interbank linkages through credit market instruments contribute to higher 
systemic risk and a more fragile economy; most of these studies employ theoretical modeling because interbank data 
are usually either unavailable or intractable. See Iori et al .(2006) and Battison et al. (2009). 
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are as follows. First, the banks should be Korean. This means that the headquarters of the bank should be 
located within the national boundaries of Korea; therefore, branches or affiliates of foreign banks are 
eliminated. Second, given the major differences in the accounting standards and purposes of establishment 
between commercial and special-purpose banks, the Korea Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of 
Korea, and the Nong-hyup (agricultural cooperative) are excluded from our samples. 
One critical issue of the panel data analysis is the ‘survivorship bias'. In effect, in the aftermath of the massive 
foreign currency crisis in 1997 and the delay in restructuring the Korean banking sector, merger and 
acquisition deals with banks continued even into the early 2000s.6
On the other hand, though the role of WSF is critical for this study, the exact definition or coverage of WSF 
depends on the relevant literature. For the purpose of this study, we calculate ‘WSF’ as the sum of inter-bank 
borrowing, financial bond issues, repurchase agreements and certificates of deposits, thus covering most 
kinds of non-deposit bank funding. In additon, ‘WSF’ includes funding from overseas, such as inter-bank 
foreign currency borrowing or foreign currency denominated bond issue, which will be further discussed in 
Section 4.4. 
 Hence, because the survivorship problem 
may cause a serious bias in our study, we address this issue first. The majority of bank M&A deals in the 
early 2000s were equal mergers between different banks that had few overlapping business and 
specialization domains. Therefore, banks' balance sheet data, which include outstanding figures on the last 
day of the quarter, had no critical breakpoints in the time series before or after the mergers. That is, when 
banks A and B merged to form the new Bank C, the before-merger bank A and bank B data combined 
smoothly, leading to a continuous time series of data for Bank C. In addition, by logarithmic transformation 
of the data, which is common in this kind of analysis, the survivorship problem becomes trivial, even though 
there were actual breakpoints within the raw before-merger bank data. Hence, we added the separate values 
of before-merger banks so that there are no missing values in our sample. In sum, the data used in this study 
are the balanced panel data of 14 Korean domestic banks that maintained ongoing business as of the 2nd 
quarter of 2011. 
 
3.2. Empirical Trends 
We present representative empirical trends in the aggregate sample data. Figure 1 indicates that the average 
growth rate of total bank assets has generally exceeded the GDP growth rate. This indicates there has been 
                                           
6  During the sample period, the following bank mergers occurred: Shinhan Bank+Choheung Bank+Chungbuk 
Bank.+Kangwon Bank (finalized in 2006-2), Woori Bank+Peace Bank of Korea (finalized in 2002-1), Hana 
Bank+Seoul Bank (finalized in 2002-4) and Kookmin Bank+Korea Housing Bank (finalized in 2001-4) 
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an over-expansion of banks’ leverage in the recent decade, which is consistent with the common perception. 
Additionally, the right panel of Figure 1 shows that before the initiation of the financial crisis in 2008, banks’ 
asset growth had been accompanied by an increasing reliance on WSF and that the share of overseas WSF 
was increasing as well. In the same vein, the abrupt shrinkage of asset expansion for banks was coincidental 
with a decreased reliance on both domestic and foreign WSF. 
 
  
Fig. 1. Bank asset growth, GDP growth and bank liability structure 
 
Notably, as Figure 2 indicates, when banks’ asset expansions were deactivated by contagions from the 
financial crisis in 2008, banks’ funding preferences changed, placing increased emphasis on funding via 
deposit rather than on WSF, which resulted in lower shares of WSF. The standard deviation of WSF among 
banks also decreased, which reflects that a decreased reliance on WSF was a common phenomenon among 
banks.  
  
Fig. 2. Bank liability structure, on average (in 100 mil. won) 
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Considering the various trends with regard to the currency of WSF, after the financial crisis in 2008, Korean 
banks dramatically reduced Won (Korean currency)-denominated WSF, mainly CDs and financial bonds. 
However, WSF from foreign creditors underwent few or minimal adjustments. The trend in the composition of 
WSF is clearly depicted in Figure 3. Neither the amount of inter-bank foreign currency borrowings nor the 
foreign-currency denominated financial bond showed a definite downward trend, though there was some loss 
in volume. 
  
(Korean Won) (Foreign Currency in Won) 
Fig. 3. Composition of wholesale funding (in 100 mil. won) 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Econometric Methods 
The statistical stability of the time span should be certain enough to conduct an econometric analysis. 
Particularly in Korea, we cannot deny the possibility of structural changes in the economy during the 11 
years of the sample period. Thus, to control the time effect due to possible structural changes and to 
determine the dynamics of the relationship among the variables in more detail, we applied the ‘rolling 
regression’ method, which is in contrast to the common techniques in many empirical studies, e.g., inclusion 
of a time dummy variable7
Figure 4 depicts the main framework of our empirical analysis. The seemingly complex structure of the 
. At each rolling regression, the time window was set as 12 quarters, or 3 years. 
                                           
7 This common method may not work in the case of long panels such as ours because including a time dummy 
responding to each time spot can lead to a singularity problem in an estimation process. 
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estimation process has the advantage of identifying various factors that could not be dealt with in a one-shot 
estimation of a single equation. By splitting up of the estimation process, we expect to identify the 
determinants of bank funding decisions, to determine the extent to which and the way in which the banks’ 
liability structure influences loan operations, and finally, to grasp the potential driver of macroeconomic 
fluctuations. 
 
Fig. 4. The outline of the estimation framework 
 
With respect to other aspects, the separation of the liability structure estimation from the loan behavior 
estimation challenges the widely recognized perception that in a bank, the decision on how to raise funds 
and the decision related to loan supply are not related. Once a bank decides to whom and to what extent it 
lends funds, where the funds come from is irrelevant. In short, there is no customized funding for a specific 
loan, which is reminiscent of the myth of the Modigilani-Miller theorem in a perfect capital market.8 If this 
myth were true, funding structures would have no effect on the lending decision. Contrary to this prevalent 
perception, we test the validity of the myth by separately estimating the factors that affect the funding and 
lending behaviors of banks. Hence, separate estimations of the individual steps reveal the inner mechanism 
of the lending channel through which bank lending influences macroeconomic fluctuations9
In the first step of estimation, we analyze the banks’ liability structure determination process using specific 
factors of the bank and macroeconomic variables, particularly focusing on WSF. We construct an estimation 
model consisting of a system of three equations. The regressands of each equation are as follows: the share of 
. 
                                           
8 For an account of the failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks, see Van den Heuvel (2002). 
9 This phased estimation process is also consistent with the well-known economic theory. The effect on the banking 
sector incurred by banks' funding/lending behaviors and capital enhancements spreads by way of many steps, that is, 
the indirect impacts on asset allocation and the production of goods; fiscal policy has direct impacts. 
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WSF in the liability, the year-over-year (hereafter y-o-y) growth rate of WSF and the normalized deviation of 
WSF from its trend; all of these are expected to be the proper indicators of the liability structure of banks.10
In the second estimation step, we analyze the effect of banks' WSF indicators on the procyclicality of bank 
credit. Regressors in the equation are fitted values of the first estimation step. If the bank credit response to 
the real economy fluctuation is excessive, it will be a major factor in amplifying the business cycle fluctuation 
in the next period because it will distort the liquidity allocation process. 
 
The system of equations resembles a vector autoregression (VAR) model that includes the lagged variables 
of each equation’s regressands. Actual estimations of systems are performed via 3SLS with individual fixed 
effects. 
In the final estimation step, unfortunately, we cannot estimate the macroeconomic implications of bank 
lending behavior in our econometric framework. According to our framework, we should estimate the real 
economic fluctuation or fragility using the fitted values of the second estimation step. However, while we 
use the panel data on individual banks until the second step, estimating the macroeconomic relationship 
requires placing the macro level variable, that is, the GDP deviation or GDP fluctuation, on the left-hand side 
of equation. This means that the regressands of the equation are the same across the panel, while individual 
bank-specific variables are used as regressors on the right-hand side. This type of estimation would be 
illogical. 
Aggregating bank-specific data would also cause a massive loss in degrees of freedom. With few degrees of 
freedom, the estimation result would not be robust, and the problem due to singularity would persist. 
Therefore, we would briefly provide the macroeconomic implications of bank credit. Despite the 
shortcomings of our estimation framework, we hold to it because it has the ability to reveal the individual 
inner mechanisms of how bank credit works, given there are a vast number of studies on bank credit 
channels at the aggregate level.  
 
4.2. First Step  
As previously mentioned, in the first estimation step, we analyzed the bank’s funding behavior, focusing on 
WSF. The regressands of the equations are the indicators reflecting the individual bank’s preference 
                                           
10 The variables for growth rate and the level of WSF are included simultaneously in our system of equations. It may look 
inappropriate to include both in one system. However, the WSF level is determined by the bank’s total liability level, 
while the WSF growth rate is simply the y-o-y growth rate of the bank’s WSF. Each variable tells a different story in 
the same system. We can identify the linkage and dynamics between the WSF level or growth rate; these dynamics 
include deacreases or increases compared to the previous level. 
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regarding WSF, and the regressors in the equations are the probable factors influencing WSF, such as the 
amount of capital, asset operation behavior, dynamics of non-performing loans, asset price dynamics, 
interest rate fluctuations, funding gap (the difference between operating assets and liabilities) and the 
dependence of other banks on WSF. 
For the interest rate variables representing the relative cost of the bank's funding, we used the over-night call 
market interest rate variables (non-collateral)11, the average interest rate of loans and deposits, and the 
spread between the return on a 3-year treasury note and a AA-grade corporate bond. For the other variables, 
such as the amount of bank assets, loans, and non-performing loans and asset (housing) prices, we used the 
y-o-y growth rate of each variable. Finally, for the other variables, including the other banks’ dependence on 
WSF, the relative loan amount to total asset volume, and the funding gap, we used the percentage value of 
each variable. Another important variable worthy of consideration is the bank's excess capital. It is rational to 
expect that a bank confronted with loan demands prefers to use its excess capital holdings above the 
regulatory level rather than using cost-incurring outside funding, thus suggesting an adverse relationship 
between the bank’s excess capital and its reliance on WSF. Therefore, we used the banks’ excess capital 
holdings above the capital standard of CAMELS (Capital, Asset, Management, Earning, Liquidity and 
Sensitivity to market risk) criteria, as recommended by the Korea Financial Supervisory Service (FSS)12
We used the banks’ WSF indicators, as defined in Section 3, as the regressands, and we did not distinguish 
between domestic and overseas WSF. The three regressands in the system equations are the WSF ratio to 
each bank’s total liability, the y-o-y growth rate of the WSF outstanding value and the normalized deviation 




                (1)  
  
                                           
11 Because there are no changes in policy rate between the period of the monetary policy decision meeting and there may 
be no change even after several meetings, instead of this sticky policy rate, we use the over-night call rate in 
estimation. 
12 While BIS’s regulatory capital level has stayed at 8%, FSS adjusted its bank management testament’s first-grade 
criteria on capital in response to financial crisis contagion: in the first half of 2009, FSS hiked its criteria, 10% of total 
capital to 12% and 7% of tier 1 capital to 9%. This change was implemented with the ‘Bank Capital Enhancement 
Fund’ being activated. In Korea, this measure is important because banks would make efforts to comply with FSS’ 
criteria thoroughly to manage their market reputations. 
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We estimated the system equations using the 3SLS technique considering individual fixed effects. We 
exploited the advantage of seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) by controlling correlations among 
equations and among panel entities in a system of equations where each equation had regressors similar to 
those of any VAR model. In addition, we used instrumental variables to obtain the fitted value of regressors 
and then used those fitted values for the estimation process. In sum, the 3SLS method enables us to avoid 
any possible problems that would occur in correlations between regressors and cause errors in the 
individual equations.13
Because any macroeconomic variable cannot be perfectly exogenous, establishing the pools of instrumental 
variables is of great concern. Therefore, we used the seemingly predetermined or exogenous variables, such 
as the lagged regressors or the banks’ balance sheet variables, including the net profit indicators, which are 
thought to have little feedback on regressands and other macroeconomic indicators. Furthermore, by 
expressing the regressors of each system equation by the linear combination of exogenous variables, we 
eliminated the idiosyncratic fluctuations contained in the regressors of system equations. This reflects our 
effort 1) to explain the dynamics of the bank lending channel with only a limited class of regularly reported 
bank-specific and macroeconomic variables and 2) to observe the inner mechanism of the bank’s behavior, 
which relates to funding and lending in a more explicit manner.  
 
The estimation results are presented in Appendix. The prior purpose of the first estimation step was to 
obtain the fitted values to be used in the second step. The fitted values are the linear combination of the 
bank’s specific balance sheet variables and the macro variables without idiosyncratic and irregular variations. 
That is, significant tests for the individual coefficients of equations are of little importance. In addition, while 
structural fluctuations seem to exist during the whole sample period, the coefficient of determination of each 
rolling regression showed little fluctuation. This result meets our prior expectation regarding the structural 
dynamics of economy; thus, applying rolling regression proves to be the correct strategy because the 
individual regressor’s contribution varies from one sub-sample to another. The results also show that there 
are inter-correlations among regressands in the system of equations, which are similar to a three-variable 
VAR model, thus supporting the validity of our estimation framework. 
 
                                           
13 Though the lagged variables of regressands are on the right-hand side of the equations, we did not use a common panel 
GMM method because of the rolling regression framework we adopted. Adjusting the instrumental variables to fit the 
model appropriately at each rolling of estimation is not only arbitrary but runs the risk of undermining the consistency 
of our estimation process. Moreover, the given model specification criteria applied to test the suitability of the GMM 
estimation cannot be fully satisfied to every equation and every rolling in practice; therefore, the GMM method fares 
no better than ours. 
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4.3. Second Step 
The second step is to estimate the procyclicality of bank credit and to identify the determinants of this 
process. We used the fitted values of the first step’s regressands as regressors in the behavioral equation. In 
this step, the estimation procedure is simpler than the first, as the econometric model is reduced to a single 
equation. As in the first step, the individual bank’s fixed effect was considered, and the GMM technique was 
not employed because of the previously stated reason. 
The most important part of the second step is determining the regressand. As we estimate the impact of WSF 
on bank credit fluctuation, we define a bank credit sensitivity measure that is an indicator variable to 
estimate bank credit fluctuation. As noted in Section 1, it is natural to assume that the bank credit cycle is, to 
some degree, synchronized with the business cycle. This synchronization would not be a critical problem, 
however, if and only if there were moderate loan adjustments at the macro level during an economic 
downturn, which would be a natural adjustment converging to a new equilibrium. In the case where the 
bank credit cycle is a critical problem, the over-responses of bank credit compared to the business cycle 
should be evaluated; during downturns, the excessive response of credit, including the cutting-off of lending, 
would result in further liquidity shortages, thus aggravating the pressing economic recession. Hence, we 
defined the measure of sensitivity of credit growth to the business cycle, θit. This is a variation of the concept of 
elasticity. 
 
,   ,          (2)      
 
As with the previous measures for credit procyclicality, we applied the same concept to the regressors. While 
we used the fitted value earned from the first step for the two variables of the WSF ratio and the growth rate 
of WSF, we built another variable for the WSF deviation in the same manner as the numerator of the bank 
credit sensitivity measure. By dividing the fitted value of the WSF deviation by the GDP deviation, we built 
the measure of the WSF sensitivity, εit.14
 
  
                                           
14 It may seem coherent to estimate the WSF sensitivity directly in the first step and use its fitted value in the second step. 
However, including the WSF sensitivity measure directly in the system equations makes the model’s explanatory 
power less reliable because of the inherent volatility of the measure. In addition, including this measure does not meet 
our purpose of separating steps to find the driving factors of oversensitivity of credit in the second step. 
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, ,          (3) 
 
We then estimate the following single behavioral equation (4).  
     (4) 
 
The coefficients β1 to β3 are the regression coefficients of the main variables. Xt is the GDP deviation from its 
time trend, as defined above, and  are the other factors, which include loan to asset ratio, excess capital 
holding, and overnight interest rate. Considering possible correlations between a bank’s own non-observable 
characteristics and other regressors, we estimated equation (4) with individual fixed effects. Likewise, in the 
first step, for the 46 quarters of our sample, we conducted the rolling regression 11 times. The results are 
presented in Table 1. 
As Table 1 clearly shows, the sensitivity of WSF has a significantly positive impact on the sensitivity of bank 
credit to the business cycle. This result generally holds regardless of the period covered in each of the sub-
samples. In other words, if a bank is over (under)-funded in the WSF market in response to the real economy 
growth (decline), then bank credit would be overly sensitive as well, and it would be a common aspect of 
bank lending, regardless of the corresponding time period. This finding is not surprising as over-borrowing 
would mean over-lending and would, in turn, result in the bank over-borrowing from its counter party. This 
finding suggests that unregulated WSF may contribute to the excessive expansion in the credit cycle. 
On the other hand, two other major variables, the WSF ratio and the WSF growth rate, seem to have little 
impact on the sensitivity of bank credit. There is no doubt that these variables may have explanatory power 
with respect to the dynamics of the loan volume. In explaining what caused the over-sensitivity of bank 
credit, however, these variables were found to have no impact. In our framework, procyclicality of bank 
credit is defined in relative terms as the fluctuation between the credit volume and the GDP. There is a 
chance that the volume and the growth rate variables of WSF contribute to the dynamics of bank credit 
rather than to the relative dynamics. However, to observe the relative dynamics of bank credit, it is better to 
focus on the relative dynamics of the funding structure of the banks. The result of doing so suggests that the 
over-lending tendency may occur even when banks have relatively low shares of WSF, and in this respect, 
recognizing WSF sensitivity as the main driver of excessive procyclicality of bank credit is of more 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
variables  
Intercept 16.98  38.53  1.39  -2.77  -24.76  0.06  16.10  -6.53  -3.53  -9.36  -6.07  
 8.86  16.70  6.85  4.92  17.33  6.71  61.01  4.69  5.46  8.52  5.77  
 1.92  2.31  0.20  -0.56  -1.43  0.01  0.26  -1.39  -0.65  -1.10  -1.05  
Loan sensitivity(-1) -0.04  -0.23  -0.14  0.04  -0.57  0.03  -0.08  0.17  0.01  0.02  -0.05  
 0.08  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.04  
 -0.56  -3.10  -1.63  0.45  -4.91  0.40  -1.09  2.67  0.22  0.29  -1.27  
Fitted WSF growth 
rate 
0.04  0.01  -0.01  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  0.11  0.00  -0.01  0.08  0.03  
0.02  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.16  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.03  
 1.45  0.26  -0.92  -0.21  -0.58  -1.60  0.69  -0.38  -0.68  2.01  0.98  
Fitted WSF ratio 
-0.11  0.32  -0.04  -0.01  -0.11  0.08  -0.09  -0.13  -0.06  -0.26  -0.05  
0.10  0.18  0.08  0.05  0.20  0.07  0.70  0.05  0.09  0.13  0.09  
 -1.06  1.79  -0.48  -0.13  -0.56  1.14  -0.13  -2.66  -0.67  -2.01  -0.61  
Fitted WSF 
sensitivity 
0.61  0.64  0.14  0.02  0.67  0.64  0.39  0.56  1.20  0.87  0.35  
0.13  0.11  0.10  0.14  0.10  0.08  0.05  0.11  0.11  0.07  0.09  
 4.54  5.62  1.29  0.12  6.60  8.30  7.88  5.31  11.34  12.81  4.05  
Loan to asset -0.17  -0.24  0.07  0.06  0.24  0.00  -0.64  0.13  0.11  0.28  0.10  
 0.07  0.14  0.07  0.06  0.25  0.11  0.91  0.05  0.08  0.12  0.07  
 -2.41  -1.73  0.91  1.02  0.96  0.03  -0.70  2.39  1.40  2.24  1.37  
Excess capital 0.03  0.61  0.08  -0.21  -1.33  0.54  1.00  -0.94  -0.43  0.12  0.23  
 0.34  0.63  0.28  0.14  0.64  0.34  2.78  0.18  0.20  0.32  0.22  
 0.10  0.97  0.28  -1.53  -2.07  1.56  0.36  -5.15  -2.13  0.37  1.05  
Call rate -0.99  -7.50  -1.39  -0.22  3.52  -0.77  6.03  1.00  -0.39  -0.39  0.28  
 1.40  2.30  0.79  0.62  2.13  0.65  6.63  0.74  0.36  0.48  0.39  
 -0.70  -3.26  -1.77  -0.36  1.65  -1.18  0.91  1.36  -1.09  -0.81  0.73  
GDP deviation -0.20  1.49  -0.69  0.28  0.39  -0.31  2.43  -1.10  0.48  -0.43  -0.42  
 0.27  0.44  0.20  0.16  0.76  0.31  3.30  0.94  0.40  0.46  0.29  
 -0.76  3.37  -3.51  1.77  0.52  -1.03  0.74  -1.17  1.18  -0.94  -1.46  
Table 1. Loan sensitivity results 
Notes: The first row of each variable is for its coefficient, the second row is for its standard error, and the third row is for 
t-statistics. The shaded areas indicate the case of t-statistics exceeding 2 in the absolute value. Same marking rule applies 
hereafter. 
 
Finally, the results from the most recent sub-sample beginning in the 3rd quarter of 2008 are noteworthy. 
Although the direct effect of the intervention of the monetary authority was found to be insignificant, the 
result suggests the existence of an indirect channel of the monetary policy. A monetary authority could have 
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prevented the further economic downturn caused by the reduction in bank lending by reducing the 
overnight interest rate.15
To add briefly to the third step, as noted in Section 4.1, it would be unreasonable to estimate and compare 
the macro level variables, which are identical at every panel entity, with the variables representing the 
individual specific characteristics of panel entities. Rather, we describe briefly the macroeconomic 
implication of over-sensitivity of bank credit incurred by over-sensitivity to WSF.  
 At least to some degree, the monetary authority can affect how banks fund, and 
thus, through this channel, it can indirectly influence banks’ strategies with respect to asset operations, 
which can overheat the business cycle. 
 
Fig. 5. GDP deviation to aggregate loan deviation 
 
Figure 5 shows the normalized trend deviation of the GDP to the average loan deviation. Notably, the ratio 
between the two variables has, at times, exceeded the absolute value of 1, which means that the real 
economy has reacted sensitively to bank credit fluctuations. From this reaction, we can infer the 
macroeconomic implications of the bank lending channel, although it works indirectly in our study. 
 
 
5. Role of overseas WSF 
 
We estimated and discussed the inner mechanism of how banks' WSF could affect their credit supply and 
                                           
15 The overnight interest rate was estimated to have a significant positive effect on WSF deviation at the first-step 
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found that WSF could affect the sensitivity of bank lending, and this, in turn, could result in further business 
cycle fluctuations. It is probable that whether the funds are from domestic or foreign creditors makes a 
difference with respect to their impact and channel on credit procyclicality. In actuality, because countries 
such as Korea have suffered from the volatile flows of foreign capital, which has led to over-fluctuations of 
exchange rates and accumulations of currency mismatch risk, this analysis could provide further 
macroeconomic implications. 
The majority of foreign currency inflows and outflows are from institutional trade because domestic 
commercial banks are one of the major borrowers in this market. In Korea, on average, overseas WSF, 
defined as the sum of inter-bank foreign currency borrowings and foreign currency denominated financial 
bonds, has remained constant at its maximum, that is, slightly below 40% of the domestic currency 
denominated WSF, as shown in Figure 6. While its absolute and relative volumes are still smaller than the 
domestic, it is noteworthy (see Figure 3) that the relative volume of overseas WSF has increased, even after 
the financial crisis, although this increase partially reflects a dramatic decrease in domestic currency 
denominated WSF. 
 
Fig.6. WSF volume comparison: Foreign vs. Domestic (on average among banks) 
We separated the total WSF into one denominated by domestic currency and one denominated by foreign 
currency to analyze the dynamics and effects of the latter on bank credit fluctuation. The estimation 
framework is identical to that in the previous section, and therefore, we report the results of the second-step 
estimation only.  
The results displayed in table 2 and 3 indicate that the impact of overseas WSF on bank lending is more 
marked compared to the previous results for total WSF and with only domestic currency denominated WSF. 
It meets our prior expectation that overseas WSF contributes more to fluctuations in bank credits than does 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Variable
s 
 
Intercept 3.79  36.85  1.66  -5.45  -14.86  -2.36  26.67  1.45  -4.05  -13.05  -4.11  
 9.51  15.20  6.11  4.54  17.14  7.24  72.35  5.25  6.40  8.40  5.41  
 0.40  2.42  0.27  -1.20  -0.87  -0.33  0.37  0.28  -0.63  -1.55  -0.76  
Loan sensitivity(-1) 0.01  -0.22  -0.12  0.03  -0.55  0.13  -0.12  0.22  0.01  0.04  -0.01  
 0.08  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.11  0.08  0.08  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.04  
 0.13  -2.93  -1.49  0.39  -4.83  1.68  -1.46  3.40  0.10  0.69  -0.21  
Fitted WSF growth 
rate 
0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.02  -0.05  0.00  -0.05  -0.04  -0.02  
0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.09  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  
 1.07  1.21  0.39  -0.53  -0.41  1.24  -0.57  -0.10  -2.98  -1.68  -1.28  
Fitted WSF ratio 
0.01  -1.17  -0.53  -0.27  0.96  -0.42  0.90  -0.03  0.31  0.28  -0.29  
0.39  0.63  0.28  0.22  0.95  0.40  4.06  0.20  0.35  0.54  0.29  
 0.03  -1.86  -1.85  -1.23  1.01  -1.05  0.22  -0.15  0.89  0.51  -0.99  
Fitted WSF 
sensitivity 
0.48  0.85  0.47  0.57  0.73  1.22  0.41  0.30  0.60  0.86  0.30  
0.10  0.15  0.09  0.19  0.10  0.19  0.17  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.14  
 4.98  5.87  5.05  3.06  7.15  6.28  2.40  2.48  8.18  12.41  2.18  
Loan to asset -0.06  -0.08  0.06  0.07  0.15  0.04  -0.49  0.06  0.00  0.18  0.08  
 0.08  0.15  0.07  0.06  0.25  0.12  1.07  0.06  0.09  0.13  0.08  
 -0.78  -0.55  0.86  1.18  0.58  0.36  -0.46  1.07  0.04  1.37  1.03  
Excess capital 0.01  -0.03  -0.10  -0.30  -1.55  0.23  0.73  -0.64  -0.10  -0.29  0.03  
 0.34  0.62  0.31  0.14  0.66  0.37  3.41  0.19  0.22  0.34  0.22  
 0.04  -0.05  -0.33  -2.14  -2.34  0.61  0.21  -3.40  -0.45  -0.87  0.13  
Call rate 0.07  -6.66  -0.91  0.66  0.72  0.12  0.38  -0.91  0.92  0.31  0.14  
 1.44  2.21  0.80  0.65  2.06  0.65  7.26  0.91  0.37  0.38  0.44  
 0.05  -3.02  -1.14  1.02  0.35  0.19  0.05  -1.00  2.48  0.82  0.32  
GDP deviation -0.12  1.18  -0.53  0.27  0.54  -0.29  0.44  0.97  -0.64  -0.04  -0.37  
 0.27  0.44  0.18  0.14  0.72  0.34  3.88  1.19  0.44  0.38  0.24  
 -0.46  2.68  -3.00  1.93  0.75  -0.87  0.11  0.82  -1.47  -0.10  -1.53  











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Variable
s 
 
Intercept 21.70  35.14  2.49  -2.96  -22.58  -0.80  14.61  -7.04  -3.76  -10.64  -5.93  
 9.00  16.42  6.75  4.78  18.02  6.85  63.28  4.68  5.44  8.65  5.45  
 2.41  2.14  0.37  -0.62  -1.25  -0.12  0.23  -1.50  -0.69  -1.23  -1.09  
Loan sensitivity(-1) -0.08  -0.26  -0.16  0.04  -0.63  0.03  -0.07  0.18  0.00  0.01  -0.06  
 0.08  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.12  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.04  
 -0.98  -3.38  -1.79  0.46  -5.25  0.46  -1.04  2.99  0.02  0.11  -1.33  
Fitted WSF growth 
rate 
0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.03  0.20  -0.01  -0.02  0.06  0.02  
0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.15  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.02  
 0.73  -0.18  -0.61  -0.53  -0.96  -1.66  1.31  -0.60  -1.35  2.15  1.29  
Fitted WSF ratio 
-0.09  0.45  0.01  0.01  -0.14  0.08  0.00  -0.12  -0.13  -0.38  -0.12  
0.11  0.19  0.08  0.05  0.21  0.07  0.66  0.04  0.09  0.13  0.09  
 -0.85  2.42  0.08  0.16  -0.65  1.22  0.00  -2.81  -1.43  -2.82  -1.36  
Fitted WSF 
sensitivity 
0.53  0.46  -0.01  -0.04  0.53  0.76  0.43  0.57  1.26  0.88  0.42  
0.15  0.12  0.09  0.13  0.11  0.10  0.06  0.10  0.11  0.07  0.11  
 3.61  3.95  -0.14  -0.30  4.93  7.80  7.61  5.44  10.98  12.15  3.85  
Loan to asset -0.23  -0.20  0.04  0.06  0.20  0.01  -0.68  0.13  0.13  0.31  0.11  
 0.07  0.14  0.07  0.06  0.26  0.11  0.94  0.05  0.08  0.13  0.07  
 -3.31  -1.44  0.57  1.06  0.78  0.08  -0.72  2.46  1.64  2.45  1.44  
Excess capital 0.06  0.81  0.07  -0.24  -1.55  0.71  1.13  -0.95  -0.58  -0.06  0.27  
 0.36  0.66  0.28  0.14  0.67  0.35  2.81  0.18  0.20  0.31  0.21  
 0.16  1.21  0.26  -1.69  -2.29  2.02  0.40  -5.19  -2.88  -0.20  1.31  
Call rate -1.33  -7.60  -1.55  -0.26  3.77  -0.67  5.76  0.86  -0.13  0.07  0.49  
 1.45  2.20  0.75  0.60  2.18  0.63  6.05  0.72  0.35  0.46  0.38  
 -0.92  -3.46  -2.06  -0.43  1.73  -1.05  0.95  1.20  -0.38  0.14  1.30  
GDP deviation -0.21  1.58  -0.66  0.27  0.36  -0.43  2.80  -0.88  0.45  -0.56  -0.58  
 0.28  0.45  0.19  0.15  0.79  0.31  3.35  0.92  0.41  0.45  0.28  
 -0.76  3.48  -3.39  1.80  0.46  -1.38  0.84  -0.96  1.09  -1.26  -2.09  
Table 3. Loan sensitivity results (domestic currency) 
 
We further examine the mechanism behind the aforementioned results. That is, how does the sensitivity of 
external wholesale liabilities to the business cycle cause bank credit procyclicality even though the volume of 
overseas WSF is relatively small? We first consider Korea's economic condition. In Korea, the borrowing of 
foreign currency is much more significant than the issue of foreign currency denominated financial bonds, 
suggesting that the latter has not been a long-term stable funding source for Korean banks. Figure 7, 
displaying data from the Bank of Korea (2010), illustrates the essence of the story. Although banks included 
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in the sample differ somewhat from ours, the maturity structure of the Korean banking sector’s WSF from 
overseas shows a more distinct distribution with concentrated short-term funding. 
  
(Domestic Banks) (Foreign Banks' Branches in Korea) 
Fig. 7. Maturity structure of the Korean banking sector’s overseas funding 
 
This distribution seems to result, at least in part, from the distorted industrial structure of Korea, the heavy 
reliance on large export firms, such as Chaebol conglomerates in the shipbuilding, automobile and 
semiconductor industries.16 Furthermore, because the Korean domestic currency, the Won, is not widely 
accepted, firms have no choice but to incur massive exchange rate risk. To hedge the exchange rate risk, 
however, the major export firms in the world market demand to be in a short position with respect to the FX 
forwards contract, en masse. This demand has been matched in turn by the domestic banks’ short-term 
foreign currency borrowings17
As many studies have noted, under this kind of economic condition, external liabilities further influence the 
entire economy through the direct channel of exchange rate fluctuation in the FX market, as well as through 
.  
                                           
16 Kim and Seo(2009) analyzed the currency mismatch in Korea using the external debt data and the banks' balance sheet 
statistics. Their findings suggest that financial indicators, such as arbitrage incentives and derivative market activities, 
are associated with currency mismatches of both Korean domestic banks and foreign bank branches. In the case of 
domestic banks especially, the real economic variables, such as the value of shipbuilding orders, act as a determinant 
of currency mismatch. 
17 This mechanism can be summarized as follows: the exchange risk is transferred to the bank from the transaction, and 
then, the bank borrows the same amount of foreign currency in short-term borrowing contracts and sells it in the spot 
market to hedge the exchange rate risk. With this scheme, banks can pursue an arbitrage profit without exchange rate 
risk as long as the roll-over on foreign debt is performed properly, because the same amount of foreign debt that banks 
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the indirect channel of bank lending. This process inevitably results in currency and maturity mismatch risks 
related to overseas WSF. These risks affect the creditworthiness of domestic banks and exchange rate 
fluctuations, which can, in turn, directly distort an entire economy.18
In sum, through the direct channels of the exchange rate and the banks’ credit risk incurred by currency and 
maturity mismatch in the FX market, overseas WSF leads to a more volatile loan cycle and then a more 
fragile macroeconomy. Our estimation result that procyclicality of overseas WSF has a more marked 
statistical relationship with bank credit procyclicality is therefore not surprising. 
 Contagions from financial panics 
reflect the contribution of overseas WSF to such currency and maturity risks. In Korea, during the financial 
crisis of 2008, foreign creditors began to withdraw the money they had lent to Korean banks, not because of 
the weakened economy of Korea but because of their own funding problems. This currency and maturity 
mismatch on overseas WSF triggered a foreign liquidity squeeze on Korean banks, and it came close to 
erupting into a foreign exchange crisis similar to that of the late 1990s. In this respect, although the share of 
foreign currency denominated WSF of a bank’s total liabilities is insignificant in absolute volume, its impact 





Credit procyclicality has recently received considerable attention, while the factors that fuel the often-
excessive credit growth are rarely part of the discussions. We investigated the relationship between the 
composition of banks' liabilities and their credit procyclicality. In our empirical study of Korean banks, a 
higher sensitivity of banks' WSF to the business cycle is found to have contributed to the excessive 
procyclicality of bank credit, thus exacerbating macroeconomic fragility.  
Our discussion has regulatory policy implications. With respect to the countercyclical measures, WSF, 
through which banks are able to overextend their credit growth, is an important domain that must be 
monitored and regulated. The regulation of a bank’s WSF mechanism would contribute to financial stability 
through a bank credit channel. In a similar vein, much stronger regulations or harsher levies on banks' WSF 
                                           
18 There are many studies on the macroeconomic implications of foreign currency denominated funding, and they mainly 
focus on the risk of currency and maturity mismatches. However, a thorough investigation of the topic is beyond the 




liabilities, such as the 'Financial Stability Contribution' proposed by the IMF in 2010 and the 'Systemic Risk-
adjusted Levy' that was partially launched in Germany, should be given more serious consideration. 
Additionally, as this study implies, the over-lending by banks can be the result of their over-sensitive 
borrowing, even when they have relatively low shares of WSF, which highlights the need to monitor the 
qualitative aspects of the funding structures of banks, such as the maturity and frequency of borrowing as 
well as the quantity of bank liabilities, per se. 
On the other hand, the more pronounced effect of overseas WSF suggests the need for further regulatory 
policies. These policies are particularly needed in emerging economies with an increasing openness toward 
cross-border financial markets where the banks’ unfettered access to foreign currency denominated liabilities 
can be a fatal channel through which the credit cycle is unduly amplified and external shocks are easily 
transmitted. Furthermore, given that the banks’ rising reliance on overseas WSF is primarily due to the 
excess demand for foreign currency that is intrinsic to export-led economies, macroprudential regulation 
should aim to reform the industry structure, which is over-dependent on exports, and should aim to contain 
the unbridled movements of cross-border capitals in WSF markets. 
It has been proposed that commercial banks' traditional reliance on deposit funding would become more 
difficult to sustain and banks' WSF would become more important because of the sluggishness in overall 
income increases, the global decline in income shares of the working class, the innovations in financial 
instruments, and the continuous penetrations of non-depository financial institutions into the deposit 
markets. Therefore, clarifying the role and the effects of the banks' WSF on the macroeconomic dynamics 
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Table A.1. WSF ratio results 
 
 rolling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
variables  
Intercept 2.00  9.19  17.55  2.69  -9.10  -2.59  6.33  -2.37  -33.12  0.55  -0.27  
 5.05  7.16  11.33  5.30  6.81  9.04  7.59  6.25  9.13  2.78  5.31  
 0.40  1.28  1.55  0.51  -1.34  -0.29  0.83  -0.38  -3.63  0.20  -0.05  
WSF ratio(-1) 0.89  0.94  0.87  0.93  0.91  0.92  0.43  0.69  0.85  0.97  0.47  
 0.08  0.08  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.24  0.15  0.14  0.12  0.45  
 11.65  11.64  8.70  12.01  12.79  10.96  1.80  4.48  6.30  7.76  1.03  
WSF growth rate(-1) 
-0.02  0.07  0.03  0.06  0.09  0.08  0.01  0.05  0.08  0.07  0.15  
0.06  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.07  
 -0.33  1.47  0.77  1.52  3.61  1.45  0.41  3.76  3.35  2.77  2.00  
WSF deviation(-1) 0.38  -1.61  -0.73  -1.38  -2.14  -2.27  1.68  -1.18  -2.91  -1.97  -2.31  
 1.26  1.03  1.02  1.02  0.77  2.26  1.57  0.47  1.06  0.77  0.92  
 0.30  -1.57  -0.71  -1.36  -2.79  -1.01  1.07  -2.50  -2.75  -2.56  -2.50  
Excess loan to 
deposit 
0.04  0.00  0.04  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.12  0.06  0.04  0.00  0.11  
0.04  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.06  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.11  
 1.16  0.14  1.10  0.67  1.32  1.26  2.18  1.73  1.57  0.04  1.05  
Call rate 0.19  -1.49  -2.92  -0.78  0.99  0.12  1.20  0.14  -0.52  1.27  0.05  
 0.87  1.69  1.65  1.24  1.00  1.22  1.90  0.29  0.40  0.39  0.88  
 0.22  -0.88  -1.77  -0.63  0.99  0.10  0.63  0.50  -1.31  3.23  0.06  
Growth rate of 
housing price 
0.04  0.04  0.12  0.02  -0.07  0.12  0.23  0.24  0.30  -0.61  -0.38  
0.05  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.17  0.10  0.13  0.09  0.12  0.20  0.39  
 0.97  0.47  1.33  0.17  -0.44  1.18  1.78  2.70  2.53  -3.02  -0.96  
WSF dependency of 
other banks 
-0.16  -0.12  -0.27  -0.03  0.11  0.00  -0.32  0.02  0.84  -0.08  0.06  
0.17  0.22  0.25  0.09  0.17  0.30  0.37  0.17  0.24  0.08  0.18  



















Table A.2. WSF growth rate results 
 
 rolling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
variables  
Intercept -25.36  -17.52  31.70  31.46  -2.37  -10.96  14.42  2.05  -11.18  -17.12  7.43  
 29.21  65.79  32.82  28.42  22.91  38.70  12.09  7.84  5.06  4.54  8.54  
 -0.87  -0.27  0.97  1.11  -0.10  -0.28  1.19  0.26  -2.21  -3.77  0.87  
WSF ratio(-1) 0.10  -0.25  -0.15  -0.07  -0.15  0.03  -0.32  -0.30  0.02  0.14  -0.10  
 0.26  0.31  0.18  0.14  0.13  0.32  0.14  0.12  0.08  0.08  0.11  
 0.40  -0.82  -0.84  -0.48  -1.12  0.08  -2.35  -2.46  0.24  1.73  -0.91  
WSF growth rate(-1) 
0.84  1.22  0.89  1.32  1.55  1.34  0.92  0.84  0.76  0.86  1.22  
0.38  0.43  0.30  0.25  0.17  0.40  0.13  0.07  0.07  0.10  0.14  
 2.23  2.85  2.99  5.24  9.18  3.33  6.85  11.91  11.41  9.01  8.56  
WSF deviation(-1) -6.06  -12.77  -3.03  -14.71  -19.67  -21.86  -5.36  -2.56  -3.06  -3.54  -9.74  
 9.18  9.32  6.81  6.24  4.87  16.55  4.99  2.49  3.46  3.45  3.45  
 -0.66  -1.37  -0.44  -2.36  -4.04  -1.32  -1.08  -1.03  -0.88  -1.03  -2.82  
Excess capital 2.14  4.33  2.27  0.30  -0.43  -1.95  -2.39  -2.88  -0.56  0.53  -1.21  
 3.65  4.28  2.23  1.20  1.57  1.97  1.49  1.64  0.67  0.74  1.14  
 0.59  1.01  1.02  0.25  -0.27  -0.99  -1.61  -1.76  -0.85  0.71  -1.06  
Call rate 4.20  3.59  -8.47  -10.06  -1.45  0.09  -1.82  0.96  1.47  1.64  -0.53  
 7.32  17.58  9.09  8.06  6.34  6.06  2.39  1.41  1.19  1.50  1.84  
 0.57  0.20  -0.93  -1.25  -0.23  0.01  -0.76  0.68  1.24  1.09  -0.29  
Growth rate of 
housing price 
0.66  0.25  0.65  0.43  1.03  1.14  1.74  2.04  1.66  1.26  0.81  
0.42  0.72  0.55  0.65  0.79  0.88  0.48  0.47  0.40  0.84  0.97  























Table A.3. WSF deviation results 
 rolling 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
variables  
Intercept -1.62  -1.06  3.07  2.19  0.17  1.34  0.03  -0.28  -0.54  -0.51  -1.60  
 1.36  2.68  1.60  1.54  1.24  1.07  1.14  0.32  0.27  0.24  0.55  
 -1.19  -0.39  1.92  1.43  0.13  1.25  0.02  -0.87  -1.99  -2.09  -2.88  
WSF ratio(-1) 0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  
 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  
 -0.15  -1.15  -1.25  -0.52  0.55  -0.74  -1.29  -0.99  -0.87  0.63  0.71  
WSF growth rate(-1) 
0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  
0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  
 -0.29  0.36  0.30  1.21  3.12  -0.49  -0.47  -1.13  -0.34  -0.32  -0.95  
WSF deviation(-1) 0.64  0.51  0.59  0.27  -0.09  0.92  0.80  0.75  0.66  0.86  1.05  
 0.34  0.33  0.32  0.33  0.25  0.43  0.19  0.09  0.18  0.29  0.28  
 1.92  1.52  1.84  0.82  -0.35  2.15  4.30  8.34  3.68  3.01  3.70  
Call rate 0.36  0.34  -0.83  -0.66  -0.25  -0.35  -0.05  0.03  0.07  0.16  0.70  
 0.35  0.75  0.46  0.44  0.35  0.23  0.22  0.07  0.06  0.09  0.18  
 1.03  0.46  -1.82  -1.51  -0.71  -1.54  -0.22  0.42  1.08  1.73  3.90  
Growth rate of 
housing prices 
0.03  -0.01  0.06  0.03  0.07  0.09  0.08  0.07  0.09  -0.04  -0.12  
0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.08  
 1.35  -0.29  1.93  0.78  1.66  2.54  3.46  3.38  4.50  -0.70  -1.52  
Growth rate of NPL 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  
 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
 -0.21  -1.23  -0.79  0.58  0.29  -0.15  0.01  -2.17  -0.28  -2.68  -2.50  
 
 
